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Abstract: In this paper, the stylised assumption that one single ‘optimal’ city 
size exists for all cities – achieved when marginal location costs equal marginal 
location benefits – is abandoned, as well as the opposite view that each city 
operates on its own cost and production curves, defining a specific optimal size. 
Instead, this work maintains the comparability among cities and demonstrates 
that urban specificities in functions performed, quality of life, industrial 
diversity and social conflicts shift up and down the benefits and costs linked to 
pure physical size, leading to different ‘equilibrium’ sizes for cities. A model of 
equilibrium urban size is set up, and empirically estimated on a sample of  
103 Italian cities with data at NUTS3 level. Empirical results verify the 
empirical model on the analysed sample; results hold both with standard OLS 
estimates as well as with the use of instrumental variables in order to correct for 
the possible endogeneity of some of the variables in the model. Differences 
between predicted and real city size are interpreted with good or bad 
governance, thereby suggesting future strategies for more efficient urban 
planning. 
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1 Introduction: the debate on optimal city size 
In spite of the recent burgeoning literature on city size, urban performance and structure 
of urban systems, the present state of theoretical and empirical studies still presents many 
shades and incomplete research programmes, calling for further efforts in the conceptual 
interpretation and bridging of separated strands of theoretical models. 
The debate on optimal city size has a long-standing tradition. A large consensus exists 
in the literature on the fact that some net increasing returns exist up to a certain urban 
size: beyond that size, opposite mechanisms are at work, translating positive externalities 
into negative ones, and transforming economies into diseconomies. In this case, location 
costs increase, overcoming location benefits. As in the case of any other resource used in 
an intensive way, net decreasing returns to scale appear beyond a certain size. 
In his seminal paper on ‘The economics of urban size’, Alonso (1971) made two 
provocative but opposite propositions that puzzled and challenged scholars for many 
years. On the one hand, he justified scientific research responding to the questions about 
the existence of an ‘optimal’ city size in terms of population, opening a wide strand of 
subsequent empirical research. On the other hand, he presented the opposite view that 
optimality – in any sense – will vary from city to city, from society to society [Alonso, 
(1971), p.81], destroying the first research programme – except on a case-by-case basis – 
and the possibility of intervening normatively on the proper structure of a city system. 
Richardson confirmed a ‘sceptic’s view’, suggesting the existence of other 
determinants influencing urban agglomeration economies, beyond sheer physical size 
(Richardson, 1972). Consequently, for a long time scientific efforts were redirected 
outside the problem of searching for an ‘optimal’ size and mainly dedicated to the 
identification of urban specificities that affect urban costs and benefits. 
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The optimal condition for the entire population of the system, urban and not urban, is 
reached when urban marginal costs equal marginal benefits (to size increases) (Alonso, 
1971; Richardson, 1978). As all cities are assumed to operate with similar cost and 
production functions, the possibility opens up to give the floor to the real world, through 
empirical econometric analyses; but this implies the search for a single urban size, 
optimising costs, or incomes or net urban benefits. Yet, this contradicts the stylised fact 
of the existence of a wide spectrum of city sizes, apparently in (a static or dynamic) 
equilibrium. 
Therefore, over time, many criticisms arose against the optimal city size theory. 
These include the observations that cities perform different functions, are characterised 
by different specialisations and, consequently, operate with different production functions 
(Henderson, 1974, 1996). In the words of Richardson (1972, p.30): “we may expect the 
efficient range of city sizes to vary, possibly dramatically, according to the functions and 
the structure of the cities in question”. 
The bizarre fact is that Alonso himself was perfectly aware of this paradox, and, in 
fact, in his seminal paper (Alonso, 1971) made two provocative but at the same time 
mutually exclusive and antithetical propositions. On the one hand he justified the 
theoretical relevance of the question concerning the right size of cities (‘how big is too 
big?’; and ‘how big is big enough?’), illustrated by his well-known graphic on urban 
costs and benefits, opening a wide field of empirical inquiries on ‘optimal’ city size. On 
the other hand, in the final paragraph, he took the opposite view that cost and benefit 
curves (as those presented in the graphic) “will vary from city to city, from society to 
society” [Alonso, (1971), p.81]. This second proposition definitely destroys the first 
research programme – except for a case-by-case approach – pointing out that different 
cities operate on different cost and production curves. 
A similar paradox and theoretical challenge – one single vs. infinite urban sizes – was 
faced by the urban land use theory (the von Thunen-Alonso-Muth-Fujita trajectory), 
when it came to the issue of the structure of the entire city-system (the so-called ‘open 
city’ model). In fact, the abstract equilibrium model, even in its more complex 
formulations, ended up with an urban landscape made of identical cities, with a single 
equilibrium – and optimal – size [Fujita, (1989), ch. 5; Camagni, (2011), ch. 3]. The 
solution proposed by Henderson (1974, 1985), though, leading to infinite city sizes as a 
consequence of the assumption of perfect specialisation of cities in different sectors, does 
not present the same theoretical compactness of the main model, and may look as an ad 
hoc proposal.1 
A more recent synthesis of the same theoretical trajectory was recently provided by 
Glaeser (2008), where the possibility of justifying the existence of cities of different size 
was reached through a double path: either including in the utility function of households, 
in addition to consumption levels and size of apartment, an index capturing urban 
amenities (or urban distress) for single cities, along the lines of Rosen (1979) and Roback 
(1982), defining an equilibrium condition in which amenities offset the reduced utility 
deriving from a wider and more expensive city; or including in the firms’ production 
function exogenous elements as a city-specific productivity level (ch. 3), a term capturing 
agglomeration economies or other elements leading to efficiency increases like cluster 
effects, learning processes, skills mix, possibility of shifting employment from low to 
high productivity sectors (ch. 4). The model maintains the capability of building a  
micro-funded condition of spatial equilibrium with cities of different sizes, considering 
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elements of geographical differentiation with a clear empirical relevance, but has to 
include in a general equilibrium model specificities concerning the single cities. 
Besides, traditional neoclassical models failed to consistently incorporate 
agglomeration economies into ‘open-city’ models of urban structure along the  
von Thünen-Alonso-Muth-Fujita paradigm, trapped between a unique size for all cities 
vs. a differentiated size based on the seemingly ad-hoc assumption of a perfect and 
diversified urban specialisation [Henderson, 1974; Fujita, 1989; Camagni, (2011), ch. 2]. 
Furthermore, they lacked a true spatial dimension (Fujita et al., 1999). On the other hand, 
agglomeration economies models proposed by the New Economic Geography (Krugman, 
1991, 1995), given their high simplification of the urban system, reduced to city pairs and 
one foreign market, seem unable to interpret an urban system in which cities have 
different sizes (Henderson, 1995, 1996). 
Inside the alternative between only one optimal size and infinite sizes, different 
solutions are provided by central place models and by Zipf’s (1949) rank-size rule. In the 
first case, according to the different functional mix present in each urban rank and the 
different ‘range’ and ‘threshold’ attached to the market area of each function, higher rank 
cities are expected to show a wider size with respect to lower rank ones, while cities 
belonging to the same rank share the same size. Of course, this outcome derives from 
second generation central place models, such as Beckmann and McPherson (1970), 
incorporating a demographic size for cities and market areas, while the earlier models of 
Christaller and Lösch had no physical dimension, being defined only by a vector of 
presence/absence of different functions [Camagni, (2011), ch. 4]. The general forces 
behind the polycentric structure of the urban system refer to spatial efficiency principles, 
and have to be found in the interplay between search for production efficiency through 
increasing returns to scale and agglomeration economies on the one hand and 
minimisation of spatial interaction costs on the other (Valvanis, 1955; Fujita and Thisse, 
1996). 
These same forces are called into play in the interpretation of Zipf’s law of urban size 
distribution, following Simon (1955), but the true spatial nature of these and other 
explanations are rightly questioned (Krugman, 1995; Reggiani and Nijkamp, 2012), as 
not just geographical space – distances – but also specificities of single cities are not 
considered in this family of models. Krugman (1995, p.246) provocatively considered 
Simon’s explanation as a ‘nihilistic story’, but his pretention that the new economic 
geography actually provides a general equilibrium interpretation of the structure of urban 
sizes is far from convincing, as Henderson (1995, p.271) clearly stated: “the new 
economic geography has been unable to model a system or hierarchy of cities in which 
cities are of different sizes”.2 
More interesting seems to be a recent effort to link Zipf’s law with the entropy model 
of spatial interaction: maximising an entropy function of the size distribution of centres – 
governing the diffusion force – subject to the constraint Σr Pr.r = K – which could be 
interpreted as the cost of non-concentration, or the agglomeration potential of the system 
– an equation similar to the rank-size rule is derived (Reggiani and Nijkamp, 2012). Still, 
even if the population stock in each centre could be interpreted as the result of migration 
flows among centres, the absence of an explicit measure of distance makes the spatial 
result of the model abstract. 
As will be later explained, this paper proposes an intermediate solution to the problem 
of an equilibrium size of cities, in a different sense with respect to central place and  
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rank-size models. The model presented in this paper is conceptually similar to  
Glaeser (2008), as it aims at defining differentiated equilibrium city sizes, but differs 
methodologically, being based on a meso-approach as in Alonso (1971) considering 
single cities as optimising units, rather than on a micro-funded approach. Cities are 
supposed to share the same complex cost and production functions with heterogeneous, 
substitutable factors linked not just to economic functions but to other context conditions. 
Therefore, each of them maintains its specificity and consequently its ‘equilibrium’ size, 
but comparability (and the possibility to perform cross-sectional analyses) is maintained, 
along with the possibility to devise policy strategies for urban growth or containment. 
Much of the recent literature on Zipf’s law (Gabaix, 1999; Reggiani and Nijkamp, 
2012), though inspective and relevant in the identification of the basic drivers of urban 
size distribution and in devising linkages with spatial interaction models, inherently fails 
to explicitly incorporate space and cities’ specificities into the urban hierarchy. 
Analogously, the huge literature on agglomeration forces and urban performance (Catin, 
1991; Glaeser and Mare, 2001; Glaeser and Resseger, 2009) seems unable to answer the 
two Alonso questions. 
This paper contributes to the explanation of equilibrium sizes of cities, taking up 
Alonso’s challenge and confronting with each other the wide array of approaches and 
models that have dealt with the issue of the structure of urban systems. This implies that 
an intermediate position is assumed between the idea of a single, ‘optimal’ size for any 
city and that of an infinite plurality of ‘optimal’, but unexplained sizes, one for each city. 
Cities are assumed to be comparable, sharing common costs and benefits functions, 
thereby allowing cross-sectional empirical analyses and considering other determinants 
of urban benefits and costs beyond pure city size. Each city maintains its own specificity 
and uniqueness, and consequently is attributed its own ‘equilibrium’ size in an 
econometric model directly derived equating marginal costs and benefits to urban size. 
Both conventional and more innovative determinants of agglomeration costs and 
benefits are considered. More conventional approaches highlighting elements like 
amenities and quality of life, urban atmosphere, human capital and skills, and 
agglomeration economies on the benefits side, and social conflicts/malaise, and costs of 
the city in general (urban land rent), on the costs side. A more recent and unconventional 
literature encompasses the role of urban functions (embedded in dynamic urban models), 
the role of the city within inter-urban cooperation agreements (the so called city-network 
paradigm) on the benefits side, and the loss of efficiency and sustainability brought in by 
dispersed urban forms, on the costs side. 
The paper is structured as follows. A model for equilibrium city size is presented 
(Section 2) and then it is subject to empirical test on a sample of 103 Italian cities 
(Section 3). An ‘equilibrium’ city size for each single city of our sample is obtained and 
compared to actual size. Finally, Section 4 concludes; differences with respect to the 
equilibrium size are interpreted – beyond being the sign of our ignorance – as the result 
of an efficient (un-efficient) urban governance and can suggest future strategies in urban 
planning. 
2 A model for equilibrium city size 
The tangible and intangible elements highlighted by the literature as sources of urban 
development and size are used in an equilibrium model of urban size, which finds its 
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roots in the neoclassical stream of location choice models following the  
von Thünen-Alonso-Fujita trajectory. The theoretical model is based on a previous 
contribution by the same authors (Camagni et al., 2013), and relates to similar works in 
the literature on equilibrium city size (see for instance Royuela and Suriñach, 2005). In 
this class of models, the location choices of single individuals (firms) are driven by utility 
(profit) maximisation achieved when marginal location costs equal marginal location 
benefits (Alonso, 1960; Muth, 1969; Fujita, 1989).3 
The following implicit total urban cost function is assumed, where total location costs 
depend on the physical size of the city (size), and the intangible aspects highlighted by 
the literature, namely social costs (malaise), costs due to dispersed urban form (sprawl) 
and in general, the costs of the city, captured by urban land rent (urban rent): 
( , , , )C f size rent malaise sprawl=  (1) 
In turn, total benefits depend on the physical size of the city (size), on the intangible 
aspects highlighted by the conventional literature – namely quality of life (amenities), 
creativity (diversity), urban atmosphere (density) – and on the unconventional ones – 
namely quality of economic functions performed (functions) and inter-urban networks 
(networks) as in the following implicit function: 
( , , , , , )B f size amenities diversity density functions networks=  (2) 
Physical size acts on both costs and advantages, and thus assumes a dual nature (i.e., it 
represents a joint source of positive as well as negative externalities for city dwellers). 
A standard Cobb-Douglas specification for both functions is adopted. This 
specification is more tractable than most others, and allows to avoid the implausible 
assumptions about the elasticity of the function’s arguments (Uzawa, 1962). 
Equations (1) and (2) therefore, become, respectively: 
δ γC size rent malaise sprawl= α β  (3) 
and 
κ ζ χ μB size amenities diversity density functions networks= ϑ ν  (4) 
In order to increase the tractability of the model and without losing generality, each 
parameter is assumed to be bounded in the interval (0, 1), but for size exponent in the 
cost function (α), which is, following Alonso, assumed to be larger than one, reflecting 
an exponential cost function with respect to city size. Analytically, these assumptions 
lead to the following conditions: 
1
2
0,
( 1) 0
δ γ
δ γ
C size rent malaise sprawl
size
C size rent malaise sprawl
size
−
−
∂ = >∂
′′∂ = − >′′∂
α β
α β
α
α α
 (5) 
and 
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1
2
0,
( 1) 0
κ ζ χ μ
κ ζ χ μ
B
κsize amenities diversity density functions networks
size
B
κ κ size amenities diversity density functions networks
size
−
−
∂ = >∂
′′∂ = − <′′∂
ϑ ν
ϑ ν
 (6) 
With these assumptions, marginal costs and benefits are well-behaved with respect to the 
traditional optimal city size theory. 
This model is closed by assuming spatial equilibrium across the urban system. As 
people can freely move across space in order to look for better living conditions (i.e., they 
can look for cities characterised by higher benefits or lower costs), in equilibrium the city 
must satisfy the condition in which marginal location costs equal marginal benefits  
(MLC = MLB), thus maximising utility of people, profits of firms and aggregate national 
efficiency. The assumption of spatial equilibrium across European countries may attract 
criticism. For instance, Cheshire and Magrini (2006) find that it may hold at most only 
within EU countries. However, recent empirical work (e.g., Rappaport, 2004) provides 
the theoretical rationale for the fact that “even very small frictions to labor and capital 
mobility along with small changes in local productivity or local quality of life suffice to 
cause highly persistent population flows” [Rappaport, (2004), p.554]. 
Analytically, this implies the following condition must hold: 
C B
size size
∂ ∂=∂ ∂  (7) 
After several intermediate passages,4 we obtain an estimable functional form  
[equation (8)]: 
( )ln
ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
( ) ( ) ( )
ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
( ) ( ) ( )
ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
( ) ( ) ( )
κ
ζsize amenities diversity
κ κ κ
χ μdensity functions networks
κ κ κ
β δ γrent malaise sprawl
κ κ κ
= + +− − −
+ + +− − −
− − −− − −
ϑα
α α α
ν
α α α
α α α
 (8) 
Equation (8) shows that the equilibrium size of the city, and in particular the physical 
equilibrium size of the city, depends on city-specific characteristics.5 Conventional 
elements like amenities, human capital, industrial diversity, and unconventional elements, 
such as the presence of high-level functions and urban networking, can act as ‘shifters’, 
moving upward the marginal benefit function and achieving, coeteris paribus, a higher 
physical equilibrium size. On the other hand, elements like sprawl, social conflicts and 
high urban rents can push upward the marginal location costs, reducing the physical 
equilibrium size. 
While for the conventional elements there is a large consensus on the decision 
whether they impact on costs or benefits, for the unconventional elements guesses are 
made on the fact that sprawl represents a costs, with a notable exception in Glaeser and 
Kahn (2004), and high level functions and networking act instead on benefits. Their real 
effects will be empirically tested by estimating equation (8) using traditional econometric 
models, and find the elasticity of the equilibrium size to each single urban feature. The 
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estimated equilibrium sizes for each city can be compared to the actual population, in 
order to reveal whether in reality each city of the sample exceeds (or is lower than) its 
equilibrium size. The result – represented by the econometric residual – can be explained 
by inefficient (efficient) urban governance, and can shed light to strategies of urban 
planning (see Section 4). 
3 Empirical evidence on Italian cities 
3.1 The dataset for empirical estimates 
This paper presents a novel application of the model described in Section 2. In fact, in 
Camagni et al. (2013) we tested the validity of the theoretical model on a sample of  
59 European Functional Urban Areas (FUAs). In the present paper, the empirical test is 
carried out on the universe of Italian NUTS3 regions, which, for the sake of this applied 
analysis, proxy for FUAs in the Italian context. This assumption is also used in the 
construction of the FUA Urban Audit data base compiled by EUROSTAT; therefore, the 
estimates shown in this paper can be compared with those presented in Camagni et al. 
(2013). 
The use of a more homogenous spatial context, furthermore, could offer a more 
insightful perspective on the way the theoretical model holds and is capable of predicting 
the correct equilibrium urban size of each city. This is also based on the absence of wide 
cross-country differences, in particular in terms of different urban systems, which 
characterizes a wider, cross-country, dataset. 
Table 1 The variables, the indicators and their sources 
Type of 
variable Class of variable Variables Indicator Years 
Source of raw 
data 
Dependent Physical size of the 
city 
Dimension FUA population 2010 ISTAT 
Independent Traditional urban 
benefits 
    
 Quality of life Amenities Available hotel 
rooms per 1,000 
inhabitants 
2002 ISTAT 
 Urban creativity Diversity Sectoral diversity 
index obtained as 
the complement to 
1 of a Hirschman-
Herfindahl index 
calculated on the 
industrial 
composition of 
the labour force 
2001 Censimento 
nazionale 
dell’Industria 
e dei Servizi 
(Industrial 
census) 2001 
 Agglomeration 
economies 
Density Population density 2005 ISTAT 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
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Table 1 The variables, the indicators and their sources (continued) 
Type of 
variable Class of variable Variables Indicator Years 
Source of raw 
data 
Independent Traditional urban 
costs 
    
 Cost of the city Land rent Price of an 
apartment per 
square metre 
2010 Osservatorio 
del Mercato 
Immobiliare 
 Social conflict Malaise Registered 
homicides per 
1,000 inhabitants 
2005 Sistema di 
Indicatori 
Territoriali 
ISTAT 
 Unconventional 
urban benefits 
    
 Urban networks Urban 
networks 
Participations of 
local institutions 
to FP5 projects 
over total 
employees 
Total 
1998–
2002 
CORDIS 
 Urban functions Urban 
functions 
Share of firms in J 
and K industries 
over total active 
firms 
2001 Censimento 
nazionale 
dell'Industria e 
dei Servizi 
(Industrial 
census) 2001 
Unconventional 
urban costs 
    
 Non-compact 
urban form 
Sprawl Percentage of 
non-urbanised soil
2006 CORINE 
Land Cover 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
For each variable presented in equation (8), we defined a suitable indicator, which also 
aims at getting as close as possible to the proxies employed in the previous, EU-wide 
empirical test. Table 1 provides a summary of the dataset built for the empirical analysis. 
The variance in the data is relatively large, the use of a spatially homogeneous data 
base notwithstanding. Table 2 presents the main descriptive statistics for all the variables 
used in the empirical test of the model in equation (8). 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics for the variables included in the empirical analysis 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Population 103 570,465.40 613,195.20 88,694.23 4,194,060.00 
Land rent 103 €1,602.75 €655.26 €622.23 €3,328.66 
Malaise 103 0.16 0.09 0.04 0.59 
Amenities 103 9,451.80 13,212.81 400.00 80,388.79 
Sectoral diversity 103 0.85 0.02 0.80 0.88 
Population density 103 254.08 337.61 39.30 2,630.68 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics for the variables included in the empirical analysis (continued) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
High-level urban 
functions 103 20.52% 2.92% 14.66% 33.96% 
Urban networks 103 0.09 0.12 0.00 0.66 
Sprawl 103 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.31 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
3.2 OLS estimates 
This paper presents additional evidence on the validity of the model presented in  
equation (8), with the use of a novel dataset of Italian NUTS3 regions. In this section, we 
first provide classical OLS evidence of the model (Section 3.2). Section 3.3 shows some 
robustness checks of such estimates, with the use of Instrumental Variables estimates, in 
order to rule out endogeneity issues for the variables we believe would be most affected 
by such issue. 
The results of the empirical exercise are presented in Table 3. For each column, 1 
through 8, each individual regressor, starting from land rent, is added to the regressions. 
Table 3 Results of the OLS regressions 
Dependent variable: equilibrium city population 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant 
term 
8.93*** 8.16*** 9.78*** 11.50*** 9.58*** 12.78*** 15.34*** 12.06*** 
(1.40) (1.58) (1.62) (1.63) (1.32) (1.14) (1.64) (1.95) 
Land rent 0.55*** 0.63*** 0.05 0.26 –0.15 –0.38** –0.39** –0.45*** 
(0.19) (0.20) (0.22) (0.24) (0.22) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) 
Malaise – –0.10 0.01 –0.09 –0.17* –0.21** –0.25*** –0.26*** 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
Urban 
amenities 
– – 0.33*** 0.30*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Urban 
diversity 
– – – 0.17*** 0.07** 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.09** 
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Density – – – – 0.55*** 0.49*** 0.43*** 0.73*** 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.12) 
City 
networks 
– – – – – 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Urban 
functions 
– – – – – – 1.01** 1.18*** 
(0.44) (0.46) 
Sprawl – – – – – – – –0.32*** 
(0.11) 
Notes: *significant at the 90% level; **significant at the 95% level; ***significant at the 
99% level; standard errors are shown in brackets. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
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Table 3 Results of the OLS regressions (continued) 
Dependent variable: equilibrium city population 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
R2 0.09 0.10 0.27 0.35 0.63 0.69 0.71 0.73 
Joint F test 8.03*** 4.76*** 10.79*** 12.29*** 52.16*** 49.29*** 42.54*** 43.89*** 
Robust 
standard 
errors 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 
Notes: *significant at the 90% level; **significant at the 95% level; ***significant at the 
99% level; standard errors are shown in brackets. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
The results show a high degree of robustness, and turn out to be statistically highly 
significant (with the expected sign for costs and benefits). Overall, the model explains a 
wide share of total variability (R2 = 0.73 for the most general model, shown in column 8). 
All parameters maintain throughout the various specifications a high degree of parameter 
stability, which provides evidence of a relative absence of multicollinearity in the data. 
The only exception to parameter stability is the land rent parameter, a result which can 
easily be explained by the fact that when land rent is introduced on its own, it captures all 
advantages that the city provides; after netting out its relations with other benefit and cost 
variables, land rent captures urban costs and is the single highest cost for urban 
population. 
Model 8 in Table 3 presents the whole specification of equation (8), since both 
conventional and unconventional variables, like city-networks and high level urban 
functions, are added to our estimates. The main conclusions on all relevant variables 
hold, providing a good fit of the model (73% of total variance explained), and leading to 
the following results: 
• agglomeration economies, generically measured by urban density, do matter 
• traditional views on urban advantages, linked to diversity and amenities, increase the 
explicative power of the model (R2) from 10% to 35% 
• most recent non-conventional views on urban growth, pointing out the relevance of 
new elements like the presence of economic and power functions and participation  
to an urban network, are corroborated: these elements allow cities to achieve 
equilibrium at higher sizes, thus allowing cities to sustain the implied higher  
urban costs 
• land rent, after netting out its relations with other benefit and cost variables, is the 
single highest cost for urban population, reflected in the highest parameter estimate 
within the final model (8). 
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The empirical results also allow us to compare the city population predicted by the model 
with the actual population for each FUA, and therefore the identification of cities beyond 
(or below) their theoretically-determined equilibrium size. A comparison between the 
equilibrium city size predicted by the model and the real population level is presented in 
Figure 1. 
Interestingly, Figure 1 shows that not necessarily smaller FUAs are expected to grow 
more in the future. On the contrary, the graphical analysis provides further verification of 
the fact that the model is based on the equilibrium between marginal location costs and 
marginal location benefits. In other words, large cities not necessarily should decrease in 
size: they can actually sustain such large dimensions, and even, at the margin, increase, 
provided they grant local dwellers accessibility to a wide array of urban benefits, or, by 
the same token, a reduced set of urban costs.6 
Finally, Figure 2 presents the fit of the rank-size rule on the estimated data. On the  
x-axis, the log city rank calculated by the model is shown; on the y-axis, the log city 
population (once again predicted by the model) is instead presented. The functional form 
is best fitted with a quadratic interpolation,7 which provides evidence of the high  
non-linearities existing in the data used for the empirical analysis. 
Figure 1 Predicted urban ‘equilibrium’ size (in % on actual size) (see online version for colours) 
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Figure 2 Rank-size rule for Italian FUAs (see online version for colours) 
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3.3 Instrumental variables regressions 
In order to further rule out possible issues of reverse causality (e.g., population increases 
determining a rise in urban costs and benefits), a solid approach to causality identification 
is adopted, with the use of instrumental variables (Table 4). 
Among all independent variables, malaise (crime rates), the share of high level urban 
functions, and the intensity of urban networks are likely to be more heavily at risk of 
reverse causation. In fact: 
• crime rates are often found to be higher in large urban agglomerations (Glaeser and 
Sacerdote, 1999) 
• high-level urban functions are typical of large urban agglomerations (Clark, 1945) 
• international networks are based on nodes mostly located in large metropolitan areas 
(Sassen, 2001). 
In Table 4, model 8 is replicated (column 1) and the crime, urban functions, and urban 
networks variables are instrumented in sequence (columns 2–4). 
The instruments are chosen as to be correlated with the potentially endogenous 
regressor, but not with city population. Crime levels are instrumented with time-lagged 
social capital indicators, and lagged per capita GDP levels as a measure of urban wealth. 
Recent studies demonstrate in fact, both theoretically as well as empirically, why higher 
levels of social capital should be correlated with lower crime levels (Akçomak and  
ter Weel, 2012). Social capital acts as a non-legal constraint to deviations, via informal 
sanctioning, altering the incentives of agents – costs and benefits – to actually commit 
offenses (Becker, 1968); moreover, richer and older societies are expected to have lower 
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crime rates. Social capital characteristics are summarised by social capital infrastructure 
(social, education, and culture infrastructure as calculated by the Italian Tagliacarne 
Institute). 
Urban functions and city networks are stronger in culturally-advanced and rich 
societies that do not necessary reside in large cities. High-level urban functions and city 
networks are therefore instrumented with social capital infrastructure and a (time lagged) 
measure of crime rates. A further instrument is the number (for each FUA) of universities 
in the top 500 2003 Shanghai ranking;8 while several such high-level educational 
institutions are located outside the largest metropolitan areas, they certainly correlate with 
the share of workers employed in high-level professions. Finally, city networks are also 
instrumented with the (time-lagged) level of trade openness, which is expected to 
correlate with the intercity networks of scientific cooperation, but not with the absolute 
(physical) size of the city.9 
Table 4 Results of the instrumental variables regressions 
Dependent variable: equilibrium city population 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant term 12.06*** 11.45*** 15.63*** 12.06*** 
(1.95) (2.12) (3.04) (1.95) 
Land rent –0.45*** –0.33* –0.48*** –0.45*** 
(0.16) (0.20) (0.16) (0.16) 
Malaise –0.26*** –0.42** –0.32*** –0.26*** 
(0.09) (0.20) (0.10) (0.09) 
Urban 
amenities 
0.31*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.31*** 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Urban 
diversity 
0.09** 0.10** 0.12** 0.09** 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Density 0.73*** 0.74*** 0.68*** 0.73*** 
(0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) 
City networks 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.07* 0.10*** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Urban 
functions 
1.18*** 1.34*** 2.90** 1.18*** 
(0.46) (0.47) (1.14) (0.46) 
Sprawl –0.32*** –0.33*** –0.38*** –0.32*** 
(0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) 
Variable 
instrumented 
– Malaise Urban functions City networks 
Notes: *Significant at the 90% level; **significant at the 95% level; ***significant at the 
99% level; Standard errors are shown in brackets. 
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Table 4 Results of the instrumental variables regressions (continued) 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Instruments 
used 
– Social capital 
infrastructure 
(social, education, 
and culture 
infrastructure); time 
lagged crime rates 
Social capital 
infrastructure, time 
lagged crime rate, 
number of 
universities in the 
2003 Shanghai 
ranking 
Trade openness, 
social capital 
infrastructure, time 
lagged crime rate, 
number of 
universities in the 
Top 500 2003 
Shanghai ranking 
Partial R2 of 
excluded 
instruments 
– 0.19 0.16 0.14 
F test for 
excluded 
instruments 
– 5.31*** 2.38** 1.80* 
Anderson 
canon. corr. 
likelihood ratio 
stat. 
– 21.62*** 17.87** 15.77** 
Anderson-
Rubin χ2 test 
of joint 
significance of 
endogenous 
regressors 
– 7.99* 23.95*** 22.17*** 
R2 0.73 0.72 0.68 0.73 
Joint F test 7.61*** 43.89*** 26.82*** 43.89*** 
Number of 
observations 
103 103 103 103 
Notes: *Significant at the 90% level; **significant at the 95% level; ***significant at the 
99% level; Standard errors are shown in brackets. 
The results of the instrumental variables regressions confirm the main message from the 
previous section. The theoretical model holds even after controlling for reverse causation. 
As Table 4 shows, malaise (the crime variable), urban functions, and urban networks 
remain significant and with the right signs once instrumented. 
As for the instruments’ validity, we run the usual battery of tests, whose results are 
shown in the bottom part of the table. First, the partial R2 of the instruments is shown. 
This represents the percentage linear variance due to the selected instruments in the  
first-stage auxiliary regression. In both cases, a remarkable 14/19% of total variance is 
explained with our instruments. 
In the second block, the Cragg-Donald statistics (Cragg and Donald, 1993) is shown. 
This statistic tests the null hypothesis of under-identification of the matrix of the 
regressors/instruments QXZ. It is distributed as a χ2 (indeed, it can be reconduced to a 
Wald test; see for instance Baum et al., 2003). Since in all three cases the null hypothesis 
is rejected, we can safely infer that the instrumental variables regressions are not  
under-identified. 
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The third block in the bottom part of Table 4 shows the Anderson LR statistic, which 
represents an instrumental variables relevance test. Once again the test demonstrates  
(at the 99% for malaise, and at the 95% confidence level for functions and networks) the 
validity of these instruments as tools to exclude reverse causality in these relations. 
Finally, the last block of tests in the bottom part of Table 4 shows C statistics for both 
instrumental variables regressions. This statistic demonstrates that the instruments are 
also exogenous with respect to the variable being instrumented, which is a crucial 
condition for the instrument validity. 
The use of a time-lagged value for the dependent variable, and instrumental variable 
techniques, safely allow to conclude that reverse causation does not represent a major 
issue in our results. Although in the long run exogenous shocks to any urban size 
determinant may indeed cause circular causation (i.e., a shock in crime rates may reduce 
equilibrium city population, thereby reducing crime rates), the results in this paper 
suggest that the theoretical micro-foundations of the model of equilibrium city size hold 
to the empirical test. 
4 Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper entered the optimal city size debate by taking on an intermediate position 
between the advocates of the idiosyncratic approach – each city obeys its own rules, and, 
therefore, cities cannot be compared – and the pure neoclassical extension of the urban 
land rent model, at the limit yielding a world with cities with an identical size. While the 
former approach allows the identification of variables capable of explaining the different 
city size that can be observed in the real world, it fails in allowing city comparability. The 
structural elegance of the latter approach, instead, drives to the unrealistic conclusion 
that, with centrifugal forces that decrease over time (i.e., lower transport costs), cities will 
eventually converge to a set of identically-sized urban areas. 
In order to formulate an alternative explanation, a model of equilibrium city size has 
been derived, with agents assumed to be free to move across space and set their marginal 
location costs and benefits equal. The reduced form model has next been tested on 
sample of 103 Italian FUAs. 
The econometric evidence suggests that indeed modern theoretical paradigms, like 
the city network paradigm, explain most of current city size disparities. While rent, net of 
the urban benefits it reflects, still represents the single highest cost associated to urban 
size, cities benefit not only from attracting highly educated professionals and hosting rich 
and diversified markets, but also from pure amenities and appropriate, compact city form, 
which are found to be associated with a larger urban size. 
Besides, results clearly and consistently show that being connected to an urban 
network – in this case, a cooperation network in the scientific field – allows cities to 
achieve a larger equilibrium size. The same role is played by presence of high order 
functions, even if the empirical validation is less robust. 
The use of solid instrumentation techniques allows also to infer that reverse causation 
and endogeneity do not represent a major problem in our results. 
Empirically, this paper is based on a cross section of observations. The model here 
derived may thus be extended to a dynamic setting, whereby the equilibrium growth of 
cities is explained. Further work on this topic may therefore extend in two directions. 
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Firstly, the theoretical model may be extended to a dynamic setting, thereby allowing the 
analysis of the conditions for cities to reach their long-run equilibria. Secondly, the 
empirical work may benefit from extending the analysis (so far limited by data 
constraints) to a panel dataset, thus delving into the empirical conditions for reaching 
city-specific equilibrium size. Besides, additional empirical work may also evaluate the 
speed of convergence of each city towards its equilibrium, and how this convergence 
process is influenced by city-specific characteristics, or policy levers. 
Our empirical results have in fact allowed the identification of city-specific 
variability: some cities show an actual population which is slightly different from the 
equilibrium city size predicted by the model. Differences can be explained by good or 
bad governance, thereby suggesting future strategies for more efficient urban planning 
and the construction of sound economic and social ‘visions’. 
On the one hand, in fact, cities displaying a predicted population level lower than the 
actual one are expected to (at least potentially) grow to fill this gap. On the other hand, 
cities with an actual population higher than the population predicted by the model may 
have been able to reach this level with a prior higher quality of governance. 
An alternative explanation for the latter case may be related instead to the existence 
of different paradigms for the equilibrium city size in different urban systems. While 
urban systems in the EU or individual EU countries are characterised by a relatively 
limited internal variability, stylised facts suggest that cities in Eastern or Mediterranean 
countries, or cities in large countries with respect to cities in small ones, may be obeying 
partially different laws. 
The inclusion of such non-standard (viz. qualitative and governance) elements both in 
theoretical models as well as in empirical analyses represents an interesting challenge, 
and even more so, given the positive worldwide momentum of urbanisation trends and 
the dire logistic and management problems that growing cities will increasingly pose. 
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Notes 
1 On the other hand, showing urban heterogeneity as a consequence of a casual 
identity/overlapping of urban production and cost functions inside a given interval, in presence 
of increasing returns [as in Fujita, (1989), p.163], or as a consequence of the choice of 
different wage rates by different developers/managers of new towns, instead of the normal 
national wage rate [as in Fujita, (1989), p.166], means relying on strange, casual cases rather 
than on theoretically relevant conditions. Introducing a consistent mix of urban externalities, 
quality public goods and rankings of services and functions into a modelling paradigm-based 
substantially on the accessibility principle represents still a widely open theoretical challenge. 
Quite evidently, building on an accessibility principle, it looks difficult to take in full 
consideration elements linked to an agglomeration principle while maintaining the elegance of 
the traditional models [Camagni, (2011), ch. 2]. 
2 The complex model addressed to tackle this limit proposed by Fujita, Krugman and Mori 
(1999) still looks far from providing a convincing solution. 
3 The controversial issue concerning the capability of a pure market mechanism to lead to an 
optimal allocation of population in cities – evident in the stylised theoretical model of urban 
land use but not confirmed by more complex formulations with externalities and public goods 
[Henderson, (1985), p.262; Fujita, (1989), p.284] – is not crucial for the model presented here. 
4 See Camagni et al. (2013) for analytical details of the model. 
5 A similar result in a different theoretical context was achieved by Fujita (1989, p.151) treating 
‘the open city model with absentee landowners’ inside the land use equilibrium theory. 
Assuming two cities with two communities maximising their utilities, with similar 
productivity curves but, in one case a superior level of amenities, the model proves that the 
city with amenities, being more attractive, reaches a higher equilibrium size (which is also 
optimal). This result shows that a convergence between our approach and the one of the new 
urban economics. 
6 In fact, cities at the right-hand side of the graph in Figure 2, i.e., FUAs which are expected to 
grow, present on average a larger size, whilst at the same time being affected by lower levels 
of crime, a lower level of land rent, and a more compact urban form. A full list of statistics is 
available upon request from the authors. 
7 The best fit of the data plotted in Figure 2 is provided by the following functional form: 
 20 1 0 1ˆˆln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ,  with 14.77, 0.26 and 0.06.pop rank rank= + + = = − = −α β β α β β  
 The level of fit (R2) is equal to 0.91. 
8 Raw data are available at http://www.arwu.org/ARWU2003.jsp. 
9 Many examples of small and medium-size cities, but well connected in worldwide networks, 
include Geneva and Luxembourg. 
